We study the effect of board structure on non-US acquirer returns in 11,499 acquisition transactions from 60 countries during the period from 2001 to 2011. We find that board independence in non-U.S. firms is associated with significantly higher acquirer returns, but this effect is only present in countries with lower levels of investor protection. We contribute to the literature by documenting that due to the substitution effect between internal and external governance, when external governance mechanisms are not adequately developed, better internal governance (as measured by higher degree of board independence) reduces agency problems and leads to better firm decisions and outcomes (as measured by the quality of corporate acquisitions).
Introduction
It has been well recognized in the literature that mergers and acquisitions (henceforth M&As) are some of the most visible and important corporate decisions and investments that firms make. While recent studies suggest that acquisitions, on average, may create value for acquirers (see for example, Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki, 2011, among others) , these and other studies (several of which are summarized in Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001 ) also suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in the gains from acquisitions and that some acquisitions may have a negative effect on firm value. Over the years, several agency conflict explanations have been proposed to explain the negative effect of M&As on corporate value that is sometimes observed. These include the possibility that the personal objectives of corporate managers are often not aligned with shareholder concerns, the desire for corporate survival and protection of managers' personal positions, the availability of excess free cash for empire building, and managerial hubris and market timing.
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Given the agency conflicts that may arise when firms make acquisition decisions, corporate M&A transactions present a unique context in which to examine the role of internal and external governance in reducing these potential agency costs, especially those associated with the firm's managers. In this paper we examine the effect of internal governance on M&As.
In particular, we focus on the role and composition of corporate boards. Given the visibility and size of these investments, corporate boards, in their role as advisors and monitors are often involved in several aspects of the acquisition process (Boone and Mulherin, 2013) . We argue that 1 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) , Donaldson and Lorsch (1993) , Donaldson (1994) , Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1993 , Amihud and Lev (1981) , Jensen (1986) , Harford (1999) , Lang et al. (1991) Myers and Majluf (1984) , Roll (1986) , Narayanan (1993) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) , Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , among others. independent directors will improve the quality of acquisitions since they do not face the same agency conflicts as managers.
We examine acquisitions by a wide range of firms in 60 countries outside the U.S. To date, the empirical evidence of the effect of board compositions on M&A profitability is limited, mixed, and drawn largely from U.S. firms. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and Ahn, Jiaporn and Kim (2010) find no significant relation between board independence and acquirer returns, while Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) show that target shareholders gain when they have boards with a majority of independent directors.
There are, however, at least two reasons why the impact of board independence on acquirer returns may be different in countries outside the U.S., and why a full understanding of the role of independent directors on the quality of acquisitions requires a detailed cross-country study. First, in contrast to other countries around the world, there is actually little cross-sectional heterogeneity in the level of board independence in the U.S. Even before recent regulations (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) pushed most publicly traded firms to have majority independent boards, the level of board independence in U.S. firms was already very high and had reached an average of about 71% by 2003 (Cicero, Wintoki and Yang, 2013) .
Second, and perhaps even more important, is the fact that the external governance environment in the U.S. is exceptionally strong compared to other countries around the world.
The presence of relatively competent regulatory authorities and active shareholders, as well as the rule of law and a fairly transparent market for corporate control provides strong investor protection and external oversight over company management. This reduces the need for strong internal monitoring in the M&A process, and may mute any attempt to assess the effect of board independence on acquirer returns in a sample consisting of only U.S. firms. Indeed, in our study, we seek to assess not just the effect of board independence on the profitability of acquisitions, but hypothesize that if external governance is relatively weak (i.e. the level of investor protection is poor), as is the case in many countries around the world, better internal governance (i.e., having more independent corporate boards) will lead to better firm decisions and higher quality of acquisitions.
To address the questions we seek to answer, we assemble a dataset consisting of 11,499 acquisitions by non-U.S. acquirers from 60 countries during the period from 2001 to 2011. For each transaction, we measure the level of board independence of the acquirer (number of nonexecutive directors divided by the total number of directors), as well as the acquirer's five-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement of the acquisitions. We then regress acquirer CARs on board independence and other firm and deal characteristics. Across the full sample, we find a positive relation between board independence and acquirer returns.
We then divide the sample of firms into two groups based on the level of investor protection in the acquirer's home country. We use the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) as our primary proxy for the level of investor protection. Countries in the top quartile of the anti-self-dealing index are classified as high investor protection countries and all other countries are classified as low investor protection countries. When we do this, we find no association between board independence and acquirer returns in high investor protection countries, but a statistically and economically significant relation between board independence and acquirer returns in countries with lower levels of investor protection. In these low investor protection environments, a one standard deviation increase in board independence increases acquirer returns by 96 basis points over the five-day (-2, +2) period around the acquisition announcement. The results are robust to accounting for the potential endogeneity of board independence, the use of alternative event window and CAR estimations, the choice of investor protection measure, and various firm and deal characteristics.
Our results contribute to at least three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the effect of governance in M&As. We extend the prior studies that are based primarily on U.S firms, and show that there are many countries in the world where board independence is associated with higher quality acquisitions. Nevertheless, our results are also broadly consistent with the prior work on U.S. firms, as we show that while board independence may be generally associated with higher quality acquisitions, in countries with high levels of investor protection (of which the U.S. is one) the effect of board independence is muted. We thus offer at least a partial explanation for why prior work did not find any relation between board independence and the quality of acquisitions in a sample consisting of only U.S. firms.
Our results also contribute to the broader debate on the substitution between internal and external governance mechanisms (e.g., Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2009; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2010) . We find that when external governance is lacking (as measured by lower levels of investor protection), better internal governance (as measured by more independent corporate boards) reduces agency problems and leads to better M&A decisions (as measured by higher acquirer returns).
Finally, we contribute to the literature on investor protection. This literature has already documented that better legal protection of outside shareholders is associated with: (1) more developed stock markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); (2) larger listed firms, measured by sales or assets (Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999) ; (3) higher valuation, relative to assets, of listed firms (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002) ; (4) greater dividend payouts (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000) ; (5) less concentration of ownership and control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000) ; (6) reduced private benefits of control (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004 ); (7) reduced earnings management (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003) ; (8) lower cash balances (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003) ; (9) greater liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spreads (Brockman and Chung, 2003) ; (10) higher correlation between investment opportunities and actual investment (Wurgler, 2000) ; and (11) more active M&A markets (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) . We add to that literature by showing that better internal governance reduces agency problem in M&As, but only in countries that lack robust institutions that protect minority shareholder rights.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the literature and develop our hypothesis. In section 3, we describe our data and sample selection. In section 4 we present our results. In section 5, we offer some concluding remarks.
Literature review and hypothesis development
The fact that M&As are often the most important and most visible capital investments that firms can make means that they are often used by empirical researchers to study the effect of agency costs on firm value. While the growing consensus is that, on average, acquisitions in the U.S. (Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki, 2011) and in Europe (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) increase firm value, there is significant heterogeneity in the returns to acquirers from their acquisitions. For example in their study of acquirers in the U.S., Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) show that while average acquirer returns may be positive, over 40% of acquisitions between 1992 and 2009 were accompanied by negative announcement returns to the acquirer; many of these were in large deals involving public acquirers and targets.
The fact that many acquisitions are negatively associated with firm value has spawned a vast literature that has identified several potential agency conflict explanations for why managers may engage in potentially value-destroying acquisitions. These include the possibility that the personal objectives of corporate managers are often not aligned with shareholder concerns (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Donaldson and Lorsch, 1993; Donaldson, 1994; Jensen, 1986 Jensen, , 1993 , the desire for corporate survival and protection of managers' personal positions (e.g., Amihud
and Lev, 1981) , the availability of excess free cash for empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Harford,1999; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991) and managerial hubris and market timing (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Roll, 1986; Narayanan, 1993; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) .
The large number of potential agency issues that managers face in M&A transactions thus suggests a significant role for boards of directors. Indeed, given the size of the investment in an acquisition, boards of directors, in their role as advisors and monitors, are usually involved in the acquisition decision; the larger the size of the acquisition, the greater their involvement (Boone and Mulherin, 2013) . Of course, boards of directors consist of insiders (executives) who are subject to many of the agency issues that the literature has identified, and outsiders (nonexecutives) who do not face the same agency conflicts as managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . This suggests our first hypothesis: board independence should be positively associated with the quality of acquisitions (as measured by acquirer returns).
There at least two other reasons why M&As offer an excellent context to assess the effect of board structure on firm value, rather than a regression of, say, firm profitability on board independence. First, while directors may have a limited impact on the day-to-day operations of firms, they are likely to be intimately involved in discrete major investments, such as M&As, that influence the firm's overall strategy. Second, as Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) argue, board independence is often endogenous with respect to profitability and firms adjust their boards with respect to past performance. However, given that M&As are opportunistic and often arise from exogenous shocks to the industry that are beyond the actions of any individual firm (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005) , board structure is more likely to be exogenous with respect to the acquisition decision, than it is to current profitability.
Our study is not the first to examine the relation between board structure and the quality of acquisitions. However, the current evidence is mixed and mostly limited to acquisitions by U.S. firms. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) find no relation between board independence and acquirer returns, although they do find that acquirers who separate the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns. They suggest that separating the two positions can help rein in empire building by CEOs, cause them to be more selective in their acquisition decisions, and thus lead to greater shareholder wealth. Ahn, Jiaporn and Kim (2010) also find no significant relation between board independence and acquirer returns although they find that busy directors are associated with poorer acquisitions.
There are, however, at least two reasons why the impact of board independence on acquirer returns may be different in countries outside the U.S., and why a full understanding of the effect of independent directors on the quality of acquisitions requires a detailed cross-country study. First, in contrast to other countries around the world, there is actually little cross-sectional variation in the level of board independence in the U.S. Most U.S. firms have boards with mostly independent directors. Cicero, Wintoki and Yang (2013 ) document that, between 1991 and 2003 the typical publicly traded U.S. firm had a level of board independence that ranged from 63% to 71%. Indeed, by 2003, over 90% of firms in the U.S. had outsider dominated boards (Linck, Netter and Yang, 2009 ). Thus, any attempt to measure the effect of board independence on acquirer returns in a sample of U.S. firms may suffer from a distinct lack of power. Second, the external governance environment in the U.S. is exceptionally strong when compared to other countries around the world. The U.S. has relatively competent regulatory authorities, as well as active individual and institutional shareholders. There is also strong commitment to the rule of law and a very active and transparent market for corporate control.
This reduces the need for strong internal monitoring in the M&A process, and may mute any attempt to assess the effect of board independence on acquirer returns in a sample consisting of only U.S. firms. In contrast, in many parts of the world with poor investor protection, internal monitoring by independent directors may serve as a substitute for the lack of external investor protection. This forms the basis for our second hypothesis: the positive relation between board independence and the quality of acquisitions will be stronger in countries with poor investor protection.
Data, sample selection, and variable definitions
We use the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database to compile a list of all acquisitions by publicly traded non-U.S. firms during the period from 2001 to 2011. The only restrictions that we impose are that the deal value disclosed by SDC is more than $1 million and that the acquirer controls less than 5% of the target firm's shares prior to the deal's announcement. We then merge the SDC data with data from the OSIRIS database which provides financial, stock, and ownership data as well as information on the board of directors for more than 45,000 firms from more than 130 countries. The abnormal return is the market adjusted return which is calculated by subtracting the returns of the respective domestic market index from the firm's actual returns during the event window. 4 The main explanatory variable in our analysis (Board Independence) is defined as the number of independent board members divided by the total number of directors on the company's board. We classify board members as independent if they are identified in OSIRIS as one of the following: "non-executive director", "outside director", or "independent director". 5, 6 Our primary measure of investor protection is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al (2008), which measures the extent to which the country's legal and extra-legal institutions protect minority shareholders from expropriation by the firm's insiders.
Given that the major aim of our paper is to examine the effect of board independence on acquirer returns, we include several variables that prior literature suggests may affect acquirer returns, as these may also be correlated with the level of board independence. Thus we include as control variables several deal characteristics such as relative deal size, whether or not the target is publicly traded, whether or not the deal is a tender offer, whether or not deal payment is a mix of cash and stock, whether or not the deal is ultimately completed, whether or not the deal is recently used by Li, Moshirian, Pham, and Zein (2006 ), Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011 ), Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger (2012 ), and Miletkov, Poulsen, and Wintoki (2013 , among others. 3 Prior studies (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007) suggest that using a 5-day event window is prudent. Specifically, using a random sample of 500 acquisitions from 1990 to 2000, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that the announcement dates provided by SDC are correct for 92.6 percent of the sample and are off by no more than two trading days for the remainder. Thus, using a 5-day event window over days (-2, +2) captures most, if not all, of the announcement effect, without introducing substantial noise into the analysis. 4 The domestic market index is proxied by Datastream's total market index for the respective country. 5 OSIRIS cites multiple sources for this information including: company filings, company websites, press releases as well as direct inquiries with the companies. 6 Some directors are classified in OSIRIS as "non-executive and non-independent". We do not classify them as independent, because even though these directors do not work directly for the firm or its subsidiaries they have other affiliations with the company or its insiders.
hostile, whether or not the target firm is in a foreign country, and whether or not the deal involves taking a full controlling stake. We also control for firm characteristics such as firm size (total assets), firm operating performance (return on assets) and whether or not the firm has a controlling shareholder. Finally, we control for other board characteristics including board size, the number of busy directors (directors that hold 3 or more board seats), whether or not the firm has a dual board structure, and whether or not the CEO is also the chair of the board. We obtain data on deal-, company-, and other country-specific characteristics, which are used in the subsequent regression analysis, from SDC, OSIRIS, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Table 1 summarizes the definitions and sources of all the variables we use in our analysis. Table 2 presents summary statistics for our sample of 11,499 acquisitions made by non-U.S. firms in the period from 2001 to 2011. We restrict the sample to those transactions for which we can calculate the associated announcement returns and for which we have data on all the covariates used in the subsequent regression analysis. The mean and median CARs for the entire sample are 2 percent and 1 percent respectively. The average level of board independence in our sample firms is 37 percent implying that independent directors hold approximately one third of board seats in most companies around the world. This is in contrast with the boards of U.S. companies where independent directors often hold a majority of board seats, especially after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002. The median firm in our sample has 7 directors on its corporate board and has approximately $493 million in assets. Finally, firms with controlling shareholders (who own directly or indirectly 25 percent or more of the firm's outstanding shares), CEO duality, or dual-board structure represent approximately 30, 6, and 4 percent, respectively, of our sample. Table 3 illustrates the geographical distribution of our sample. 
Empirical results

Does board structure affect the frequency of acquisitions?
The results in Table 3 document that non-U.S. firms experience, on average, positive abnormal returns around the announcement of acquisitions. Since we are primarily interested in the role of corporate boards in M&A activity, we first explore the question of whether firms with more independent boards engage in more acquisitions. Table 4 presents the results from a probit regression (specification 1) where the dependent variable is an indicator variable which takes the value of one (and zero otherwise) if the firm engages in at least one acquisition in a given year, and from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (specification 2) where the dependent variable equals the number of acquisitions for each firm in each year. Both regressions control for firm size, performance, the presence of a controlling shareholder, and other board characteristics (board size, percentage of busy directors, dual board structure, and CEO duality).
7 In the Appendix, we also present this information at the country level.
We also include year, industry, and country fixed-effects to account for additional sources of heterogeneity which can impact both the degree of board independence and the likelihood that the firm engages in acquisitions activity. The regressions are based on the universe of OSIRIS firms during the period from 2001 to 2011 for which we can obtain information on all the covariates.
The results in Table 4 suggest that firms with more independent corporate boards are more likely to engage in acquisitions. 8 This finding, along with the result that firms with more busy directors also make more acquisitions, is consistent with the advisory role of corporate directors who can assist management in identifying potential acquisition targets through their formal and informal business networks. The finding that firms with more independent boards engage in more acquisitions, however, does not necessary imply that they create value for the firm's shareholders since the acquisition activity may be associated with agency problems as we discussed in section 2. We address this question in section 4.2.
The effect of board independence on acquirer returns
In order to evaluate whether board independence is associated with "better" M&A decisions we turn to the main part of our analysis where we investigate the market's reaction to the announcement of acquisitions by non-U.S. firms during our sample period from 2001 to 2011. These results are presented in Table 5 .
Specification 1 in Table 5 shows that, after controlling for deal, firm and other board characteristics, the acquirer's 5-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the announcement of an acquisition is positively, and significantly, related to the firm's degree of board independence.
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The estimated coefficient on Board Independence is 0.0112 (t = 1.87), which suggests that the effect of board independence on acquirer returns is also economically significant as a one standard deviation increase in board independence is associated with approximately 45 basis points increase in the bidder's 5-day returns surrounding the announcement of the acquisition.
In specifications 2 and 3 of Table 5 we split the sample based on the level of investor protection in the acquirer's home country using the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. The results in specifications 2 and 3 illustrate that the positive effect of board independence on the acquirer's announcement returns are concentrated in firms located in countries with lower levels of investor protection.
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In countries with the highest level of investor protection there is no robust relation between the level of board independence and the acquirer's announcement returns. The estimated coefficient on Board Independence in these firms is -0.0025 (t = -0.30). In contrast, in countries with lower levels of investor protection, the estimated coefficient on Board Independence is positive and significant 0.0240 (t = 2.69). In these low investor protection environments, a one standard deviation increase in 9 The adjusted R-squared in the regression is 0.04 which is consistent with the results from prior studies; for example, Masulis, Wang and Xie, (2007) report an adjusted R-squared of 0.05 in their sample of acquisitions by U.S. firms. 10 The sum of the number of observations in specifications (2) and (3) is slightly less than 11,499 because the antiself-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) is not available for a few of the countries in our sample. 11 We classify countries as high investor protection environments if they are in the top quartile of the anti-selfdealing index, because we want to ensure that the legal and extra-legal institutions in these countries provide the highest level of investor protection. 12 The results are robust to controlling for firm age, analyst following, cross-listing on a U.S. exchange, and countrylevels of financial and economic development (measured by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, and GDP per capita, respectively), and to using market-to-book ratio instead of return on assets.
board independence increases acquirer returns by 96 basis points over the five-day (-2, +2) period around the acquisition announcement.
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The split-sample results indicate that monitoring by the board of directors is significantly more important in countries where the legal and extra-legal institutions do not adequately protect shareholder rights, and therefore, are consistent with the view that country-and firm-level governance mechanisms can act as substitutes (Ferreira and Matos, 2008 , Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2009 , McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2010 .
Overall, our findings are also consistent with the results in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) who document no significant relation between board independence and acquirer returns in their sample of U.S. acquirers. Since, as we noted earlier, the U.S. offers an environment with a relatively high level of investor protection, we would expect to find that internal governance will have a less discernible association with acquirer returns. The results further highlight the need for a broad cross-sectional analysis in order to draw broad conclusions about the effect of board structure on the quality of acquisitions.
Robustness tests
Robustness to alternative measures of acquirer returns
In Table 6 , we report several different robustness tests to ensure that our results are not driven by how we choose to measure the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcements. In specifications 1 and 2, we replicate the split-sample results from Table 5 , using a market model adjusted 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the dependent variable. We estimate the market model parameters using each firm's domestic market index and an estimation period of 255 days ending 46 days before the event date. The results in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5 and indicate that regardless of what model we use to estimate bidder CARs, in countries with lower levels of investor protection the market reacts more positively to the announcement of acquisitions by firms with more independent corporate boards. Further, as previously documented, in countries which have well-functioning institutions protecting investor rights the effect of board independence is muted.
In specifications 3 and 4 we also test the robustness of our results to using a longer event window to measure the acquirer announcement CARs. The regression results using an 11-day event window (-5, +5) are consistent with our earlier findings. 
Robustness to alternative measures of investor protection and sample restrictions
Thus far, we have demonstrated that in countries with lower levels of investor protection, higher board independence is associated with higher quality acquisitions. In the next part of our analysis we examine whether our findings are robust to using alternative measures of investor protection. To do this we split our sample of acquisitions into high and low investor protection countries using the antidirector rights index from Spamann (2010) which, as discussed in Spamann (2010) , updates and improves on the original antidirector rights index proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) , and using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) index from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 present the results obtained when we split our sample into high (top quartile) and low investor protection countries using Spamann's antidirector rights index (ADRI), and columns (3) and (4) present the results after splitting our sample using the WGI index. 15 Both sets of results corroborate our earlier findings; there is a positive relation between board independence and acquirer returns in low investor protection countries but not in high investor protection countries.
In additional analysis, we also address some of the potential concerns about our sample composition. In order to ensure that our results are not driven by poorly performing or small firms, we replicate our analysis after dropping firms with negative return on assets and firms which represent a very small fraction of their respective country's stock market capitalization.
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The results from this additional analysis, which are not tabulated but are available upon request, support all of our prior inferences. Finally, all of our results are robust to winsorizing the data at either the 1 or 5 percent level. 
Robustness to alternative measure of board independence and the endogeneity of board structure
Throughout the paper, we follow the majority of the board literature and measure board independence as the fraction of independent directors on the company's board. In this section, however, we also investigate the effect of having a majority of independent directors (i.e. independent directors representing more than 50 percent of the board) on the firm's acquisition decisions. The results from this analysis, which are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, suggest that regardless of how we choose to measure board independence, firms with more 15 The indicator variables Completed Deal, Hostile Deal, and Dual Board Structure are dropped in specification (1) because there is no variation in these variables in the High investor protection countries classified using the ADRI index. 16 We rank firms by the ratio of their stock market capitalization to the stock market capitalization of their home country and drop firm-years which are in the bottom 25 percent of the sample. 17 These results are not reported, but are available upon request. independent boards and those with a majority of independent directors experience significantly higher abnormal returns around the announcement of acquisitions in low investor protection countries, but not in high investor protection countries.
Our analysis thus far assumes that board independence is exogenous with respect to acquirer returns around acquisition announcements, or by extension that board independence is exogenous with respect to the acquisition decision. As we noted in our literature review and hypothesis section, there are many aspects of the acquisition decision that are exogenous to an individual company; acquisitions are often opportunistic and merger activity tends to track exogenous changes in the industry that are beyond the control of any individual firm.
Nevertheless, it is possible that there are unobserved factors that affect acquirer returns but are also correlated with board independence. For example, since board independence is relatively persistent and may be determined by factors such as the quality of the executives or corporate culture (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012) , it may be the case that any observed relation between board independence and acquisition quality merely reflects underlying (but unobservable) factors that just happen to be correlated with board independence.
In order to address the question of causality and the endogeneity concerns which are inherent in our analysis we estimate instrumental variables (IV) Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 8 . A valid instrumental variable would be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable (board independence), but uncorrelated with the error term (ε). We propose that the supply and demand for corporate directors in the firm's home country could potentially fit this description. Specifically, we estimate the supply of corporate directors in each country by calculating the total number of corporate directors for each country using data from the Osiris database. Since the majority of outside directors on company boards are often directors at other firms (Guner, Malmendier, and Tate 2008, Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009 ) the total number of directors in the firm's home country should be a reasonably good proxy for the supply of outside directors, and therefore, should be positively related to the degree of board independence in firms from the respective country. At the same time, however, the supply of corporate directors should not have a direct or independent effect on the acquisition decisions of firms, and therefore, is a potentially valid instrumental variable.
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The second instrumental variable, which proxies for the demand for corporate directors, is the total number of listed companies in the firm's home country as reported by the World Bank's World Development Indicators. After controlling for the supply of corporate directors, we expect that there will be a negative relation between the number of listed firms in the country and the degree of board independence in firms from the respective country because, as discussed in Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013), qualified directors are a scarce human resource.
19
In unreported first-stage regressions we document that both of our instrumental variables are highly significantly related to the degree of board independence and have the predicted signs.
The results from the IV-2SLS regressions where we instrument the degree of board independence with the total number of directors and listed firms in the firm's home country support our main findings. 20 Specifically, we document that firms with more independent corporate boards make better acquisition decisions -as measured by the market's reaction to the announcement of the acquisitions -but this effect is only present in countries with lower levels 18 The supply of corporate directors can have an indirect effect on the quality of the firm's acquisition decisions through some of the other variables included in our regression model such as board size and the degree of financial and economic development in the firm's home country, but that does not violate the exogeneity restriction. 19 While there may be a direct positive relation between the number of listed firms and the number of acquisitions in the country (as there are more potential acquisition targets), there should not be a direct relation between the number of listed firms and the quality of domestic or cross-border acquisitions. 20 Since the instrumental variables are estimated at the country-level we do not include country-fixed effects in the IV-2SLS regressions, but instead control for the country's level of economic and financial development and for the degree of investor protection. of investor protection. Conversely, in countries with the highest level of investor protectioncountries where investor rights are well protected by the legal and extra-legal institutions -there is no significant relation between board independence and acquirer returns.
Conclusion and suggestions for future research
The decision to acquire another firm is one of the most important corporate decisions that firms make which explains the large literature on M&A activity in the U.S. and abroad. The The results from our paper have important implications for corporate decision makers and national policy makers who are debating the costs and benefits associated with increasing board independence. Our findings suggest that in high investor protection countries the additional oversight associated with increasing board independence is unlikely to significantly affect corporate decision making, while in countries which lack adequate legal protection of investor rights the monitoring by independent directors may be one of the most important governance mechanisms.
Our results also suggest at least two possible directions for future research. First, as we find in our study, acquirer returns are higher in firms with more independent boards if the firm is located in a country with relatively poor investor protection. This result may be due, at least in part, to investors anticipating that firm operating performance following acquisitions may be higher in firms with more independent boards in such countries. For example, it may be the case that independent boards in these poor investor protection countries are more likely to push firms towards mergers that focus rather than diversify the firm's business. This focus may be associated with improvements in firm performance (as has been suggested for U.S. firms in Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992; Delong, 2001; and Megginson, Morgan and Nail, 2004) . As such, future research could track changes in performance (and boards) in a panel of acquisitions to assess changes in long-run operating performance around acquisitions using the framework developed by Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelkar (1992) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) , among others.
Second, recent research in U.S. firms (e.g., Cai and Sevilir, 2012) suggests that acquirer returns are higher in firms whose directors are connected to the boards of the targets. Given the possibility that firms with more independent directors may have more connected directors than those with more inside directors, future research could investigate board connections in countries with poor investor protection and the effect this connectedness could have on merger value.
Table1
Variable Definitions and Sources of the Data. Number of directors who hold 3 or more other directorships divided by the total number of directors on the company's board. Source: OSIRIS.
Dual Board Structure
Indicator variable which takes the value of one if the firm has a dual board structure (supervisory and management board), and zero otherwise. Source: OSIRIS.
CEO Duality
Indicator variable which takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the firm's board of directors, and zero otherwise. Source: OSIRIS.
Controlling Shareholder
Indicator variable which takes the value of one if the firm has a shareholder who owns directly or indirectly 25 percent or more of the firm's outstanding shares, and zero otherwise. Source: OSIRIS. Anti-Self-Dealing Index An index ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values of the index indicating better protection of minority shareholder rights. Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008 Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . All other countries are defined as low investor protection countries. All specifications include year, industry, and country fixed-effects. t-statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) is the acquirer's 5-day (-2, +2) market model adjusted cumulative abnormal return. In specifications (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the acquirer's 11-day (-5, +5) market adjusted cumulative abnormal return. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 . High investor protection (IP) countries are countries which rank in the top quartile of investor protection as measured by the AntiSelf-Dealing Index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . All other countries are defined as low investor protection countries. All specifications include year, industry, and country fixed-effects. t-statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (3) and (4) we estimate IV-2SLS regressions where we instrument board independence with the number of directors and number of listed domestic companies in the firm's home country. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 . High investor protection (IP) countries are countries which rank in the top quartile of investor protection as measured by the Anti-Self-Dealing Index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . All other countries are defined as low investor protection countries. All specifications include year and industry fixed-effects and specifications (1) and (2) include country fixed-effects. In specifications (3) and (4) we control for each country's level of financial and economic development and level of investor protection using the country's market capitalization/GDP ratio, GDP per capita, and Anti-Self-Dealing Index respectively. t-statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) 
